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Reflective Essay

Reflective Essay
This past fall semester, my Security Studies class engaged me to explore some of the most
pivotal security issues in our society. The prompt of our final essay asked us to reflect on what is
the most serious security threat facing the international community today, and what would need
to happen to resolve or counter the threat, and what obstacles exist to such a solution. In my
answer, I wanted to convey my sense that the dynamics that emerge in diplomacy can parallel
those in human psychology. This mindset could enable us to understand state behavior in a new
light, and ultimately lead to a fundamentally different approach to security policy. I decided to
examine concepts related to estrangement and alienation in my essay “Diplomacy of Alienation
as a Fundamental Threat to International Security: The Case Study of Iran,” and focus on the
case study of Iran to illustrate the dynamics that isolating policies can create. According to my
thesis, the diplomacy of alienation leads to a self-fulfilling feedback loop that accumulates
insecurity and conflict in the international community, and ultimately constitutes the most
significant security threat of our time.
Initially, I started building my theoretical framework based on the scholarship of Randall
Schweller, and particularly his paper “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State
Back In.”1 As I continued my research under the guidance of Professor Jennifer Taw, I noticed
that relying purely on Schweller’s neoclassical realism and the concepts of balancing and
bandwagoning would not allow me to sufficiently explain the behavior of alienated states, nor the
responses from the international community. This forced me to fundamentally reconsider the
theoretical base that I had been constructing.
Under these circumstances, I expanded my use of different research resources and looked
for alternative scholarly viewpoints, including those outside international relations and political
science. I used online search and the Claremont Library database extensively to look for
academics whose scholarship I could apply to my research question. I was able to find, study, and
partially also utilize scholarship in anthropology, psychology, and history, for example, as I tried
to bring more depth to my analysis of Iran’s internal political dialogue. With the sources that
Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19, No. 1
(Summer 1994): 72-107.
1

were from the field of my own paper, I put a lot of time into translating the insights into the
terminology and viewpoint of international relations and thinking about their relevance and
applicability. Considering the contentiousness of Iranian politics as a topic, I was very rigorous
with my sources and put a lot of emphasis into analyzing the potential political motivations of
the writers. This was a particular challenge with online sources, which also made me understand
the importance and validity that using library databases brings. Overall, these amplified efforts
led me to find unique perspectives and engage with my research question more creatively.
I also decided to expand my theoretical approach into other frameworks within the realist
paradigm, and my research ultimately led me to Charles Glaser’s book Rational Theory of
International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation, which proved to be an
expansive resource for my essay.2 The book, as well as many others that I was using, is available
online through the Claremont Colleges database. This online access significantly enhanced my
research capabilities, as I was able to browse the book right away and evaluate quickly my interest
in as a resource. I decided to incorporate Professor Glaser’s classification scheme of states –
between security-seeking and revisionist states – into my paper. I also had prompt access to his
other scholarly work, which inspired me to shift the focus of my argument into the theory of
security dilemmas. As I started to combine these different approaches within realism, Professor
Taw’s critical questions directed me to ultimately form a multi-dimensional explanatory model
into the implications of alienating diplomacy and the possible policy solutions to counter them.
Throughout this process, an important resource was also the discussions I had with my peer
students in the class. Hearing their contending perspectives and alternative explanations
challenged me to question the strength of my arguments and develop my reasoning further.
The research paper allowed me to significantly deepen my understanding of the
theoretical paradigms in international relations, apply them into a fascinating current case study,
and evaluate different policy options based on my analysis. This process enabled me to break
down the various theories into their component parts, and recombine them in a novel way to
support my own argument. Going through multiple rounds of research, writing, and revision

Charles Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2010).
2
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enabled me to understand the adaptability and transformability of international relations theory,
and my own active agency in constructing it. This insight also strengthened my goal of pursuing
a future career in academia, which had started to interest me during my sophomore year. This
research project allowed me to prove myself how much I enjoyed the process and intellectual
challenge of academic research, and how inspiring it would be to do this professionally. Most
importantly, the project enabled me to connect the theoretical world into reality. I fundamentally
modified my own perceptions of Iran as a country, and the factors that drive its internal decisionmaking processes. This made me understand the potentially transformative nature of academic
research, but also the challenging barriers that exist between theory and practice. This disconnect
between the spheres of academia and the real world interests me tremendously, as its
implications are very visible in international affairs today. Unlocking this challenging divide
could transform the way we think about security in the real world, which is also inspiring me to
continue examining this question in my future scholarship.
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Diplomacy of Alienation as a Fundamental Threat to International Security:
The Case Study of Iran
Introduction
The most severe security threat facing the international community relates to the policy of
alienating diplomacy and its implications – the destabilizing strategies employed by states that have
become misperceived as revisionist, the counterstrategies adopted by other states as a response to
these radical approaches, and the potential for stability that is lost through the isolating policies.
Diplomacy of alienation is deeply ingrained in systemic-level great power competition, and creates a
situation that limits states’ interactions with each other, which can lead to mutual misinterpretation
of state motives. It also limits the alienated states’ foreign policy choices, constraining their ability to
demonstrate their true intentions through legitimate mechanisms and leading them to adopt radical
and extreme foreign policy approaches. This reinforces and legitimizes the perception of these states
as rogue and revisionists within the international community. As a result, the international
community adopts counterstrategies that only increase the destabilizing effects to international
security and further make the alienated states feel insecure. This constitutes a self-fulfilling feedback
loop based on a security dilemma, which accumulates insecurity and conflict in the international
community, and also has negative implications due to lost potential stability. Iran is analyzed as a
country that has gone through these dynamics, but that has also demonstrated progress as a result of
reversed alienation and reengagement efforts from the international community.

Theoretical Framework
According to the family of theories that fall under the realist paradigm, the international
system is characterized by anarchy, implying that there is no international authority that can enforce
state action or limit the use of force.1 The system is based on self-help, where states rely on their
own capabilities in achieving their security and global objectives. Due to this, power is seen as the
key consideration for states, comprising wealth, population, technological sophistication, and other
factors that enable states to strengthen their security, mainly through military capabilities.
As states form together the international community, there is also a broader context of
security that relates to the stability of the global order and the coherence of the international system.
In its current form, it is based on the Westphalian system and liberal hegemonic order that values
sovereignty, consent, and noninterference with the internal affairs of other states.2 Just as individual
states face threats originating from a variety of levels, so does the international community. Threats
to international security are defined as factors that have the capability and intent to disrupt the
international order, decrease the legitimacy of agreed norms, and otherwise harm the effective
functioning of the international system on a multinational level.3 The referent object, or the entity
that is being threatened, can be the international order itself, or the fundamental concepts that hold
it together, such as sovereignty or territorial integrity.
Different strands of realism have contrasting views on the main factors that motivate state
behavior. In the neoclassical realist framework, security-seeking states are defined as entities that
Alan Collins, Contemporary Security Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 13.
John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2011).
3 Liz St. Jean, “The Changing Nature of “International Security: The Need for an Integrated Definition,” Norman Paterson
School of International Affairs, Carleton University, http://www.iusafs.org/pdf/stjean.pdf.
1
2
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prioritize sovereignty and security and consider power as a means, rather than as an end, as it
enables them to achieve a strong and stable position in the international community. The
framework, however, also defines revisionist states that are driven by the elemental forces of power
and expansion and aim to “increase, not just preserve, their core values and to improve their
position in the system.”4 Security-seeking states will be content with a cooperative and secure status
quo, since they are already “kings of the hill,” even if this prevents them from gaining further
territory. Revisionist states, on the other hand, are motivated to pursue improvements in their
relative position in the system through competition and confrontational policies.5 This division
between states is also the basis for the difference between defensive and offensive realism,
respectively, and the two theories’ contrasting perceptions of the main factors driving state behavior.
Despite the state of the world as a self-help system, cooperative interactions are still
possible within the realist framework as a means to attain security.6 Variables that make cooperation
between states possible include the permanence of the states’ relationship, the mutual gains that only
cooperation creates, the increased costs of noncooperation, and the confidence-building measures
that increase the expectation of the other sides’ cooperation.7 The key threat is the possibility of the
other actors’ defection, so all of these factors lead to circumstances where deception becomes a less
optimal strategy. If a state considers the partner to be motivated by power, rather than just security,
it won’t trust it to cooperate and will thus adopt a confrontational approach itself.8 This will lead to a

Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19, No. 1
(Summer 1994): 72-107.
5 Charles Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2010).
6 Joseph Parent and Sebastian Rosato, “Balancing in Neorealism,” International Security 40, No. 2 (Fall 2015): 51-86.
7 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, No. 2 (January 1978): 167-214.
8 Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation.
4
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security dilemma, in which the means that a state uses to increase its security lead others to feel
insecure and increase their capabilities, leading the first state to find itself in a worse position.9
In neoclassical realism, informational variables about state motives, and status as securityseeking or power-seeking state, are seen as the key factors behind the decision to collaborate. An
individual state can decide to collaborate instead of unilaterally pursue power, but only if “both
states are sure that the opposing state is a security seeker (and if both also know that the other
knows this).”10 This emphasizes the role of interaction and signaling in defining state-to-state
relations, as “the information that states have at the beginning of their interaction can determine the
future path of their political relationship.”11 A correct perception of the partner states’ motives and
status as a security seeker or power-seeker enables states to have rational expectations about the
counterpart’s responsive behavior and make informed choices on their foreign policy approaches,
leading them to adopt optimal strategies.
The nature of states as security-seeking or power-seeking, as well as their relative power
status in the international system, determines their foreign policy interactions. Revisionist states are
always going to be seen as a threat by states that are security-oriented, but the states’ relationship
depends on whether the revisionist state is a great power or close to one, or whether it is a weaker
power that aims to achieve a higher power position and is also willing to use asymmetrical and
unconventional strategies in the process. In the former case, security-seeking states can use external
balancing to counterweight the revisionist state to increase their own security.12 But when the
revisionist state cannot yet significantly influence the balance of power in the international system,
security-seeking states won’t balance against it. The smaller revisionist state might also not pose

Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 167-214.
Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation.
11 Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation.
12
Collins, Contemporary Security Studies.
9

10
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significant enough a threat that to justify a military attack, even if it is utilizing radical and
destabilizing foreign policy strategies.
With revisionist states, other traditional foreign policy approaches are also not considered
viable options. First, the ability to bandwagon with these states is limited due to lack of trust and
imbalance in the states’ prioritization of security and power interests. Furthermore, bandwagoning
can be considered to constitute a form of appeasement and includes unequal exchange where the
weaker state makes “asymmetrical concessions to the dominant power and accepts a subordinate
role.”13 But by their nature, revisionist states will not accept this position, as it limits their ability to
pursue a higher power position, even if it provided more security. Thus, in this situation, the
security-seeking status quo states seek to alienate the less powerful revisionist states from the
international system.
Great powers that are power-seeking, however, can create collaborative interactions with the
smaller revisionist states and use them as a balancing tool. In this scenario, the states that are
alienated by security-seeking states are simultaneously propped up by those that are also powerseeking. This essentially creates a dynamic equilibrium where the concurrent alienation and
sustenance leads the smaller revisionist states to fall outside of the international system. They don’t
have an incentive to change their relationships with either side, however, as mending relations with
security-seeking great powers would risk making the supporter state feel threatened. On the other
hand, the continued backing that the smaller states receive from the revisionist great powers makes
security-seeking states unwilling to reconsider their relations with them.
Diplomacy of alienation, whether initially self-imposed or enforced by other states, is
maintained through its role as a balancing tool in great power competition. Its continuance,

13

Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.”
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however, is also related to two other powerful mechanisms. First, alienation leads to limited
interaction between states and decreases the availability of information, leading to the possibility of
states’ false perceptions of each other’s motives. States can develop a mistaken notion of another
state as power-seeking, or continue considering it as one despite a change in behavior and
motivations. Secondarily, the isolated states become limited in their foreign policy options as a result
of alienation, decreasing their ability to signal their intentions and motivations correctly. In the
absence of a full spectrum of accepted foreign policy choices, the alienated states have a stronger
tendency to adopt unconventional strategies that are seen as radical and threatening by the rest of
the international community. As the other states are operating in a fog of uncertainty due to the lack
of interaction, they often draw conclusions too rapidly about the intention of the actions of the
alienated states and find reasons to reinforce their image of these states as revisionist.
As states choose their foreign policy responses according to these false notions of the other
state as greedy, these presumed motivations become self-fulfilling for the alienated state. When they
are approached according to their misinterpreted status, they are forced to respond based on how a
state with those motivations would – by adopting radical foreign policy strategies. This initiates a
powerful feedback loop that is maintained by the continued lack of interaction, as the isolation
disables new informational variables from influencing the states’ perception of each other and allows
for continued misinterpretation of state motivations. The feedback loop represents a two-way causal
relationship that can be initiated at any of its stages, with the reciprocal confrontational strategies
and counterstrategies feeding it and forcing the alienated state to depend solely on itself in providing
its security. Thus, the situation reflects a self-help system that is taken to the extreme.
The dynamics that emerge in this situation pose the greatest threat the international
community faces, as the resulting condition accumulates effects that threaten the stability of the

6

current international order. Especially given the strong bond that the feedback loop has on great
power competition, these clustering effects can create a time bomb that can be set off by a
disruption in the relative power dynamics between states. Even if this doesn’t happen, the
accumulating effects themselves are deeply destabilizing to the international community. Alienation
causes isolated states to adopt confrontational strategies that include engaging in state sponsorship
of terrorism; developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs; pursuing highly
advanced offensive capabilities; and adopting asymmetric tactics, including cyberattacks. As a
counter-response to these, the international community often chooses actions that reinforce the
negative consequences to international security and creates conditions where the alienated state lacks
any incentive to respect international norms and act collaboratively. Alienation also leads to
secondary effects within the alienated states that are threatening from the perspective of human
security. These can include economic inequality; societal instability; and authoritarianism and
oppression of the people as the state leadership prioritizes its foreign policy objectives and prevents
the population from interfering with its strategies.
In addition to these concrete destabilizing effects arising from the security dilemma, the
situation is also a threat to international security due to the opportunity cost and lost potential
stability from disabling the alienated states from acting as full members of the international
community. They could contribute significantly more to international diplomacy, global trade, and
other aspects of multinational affairs, but their misperceived status prevents them from being
considered legitimate actors. The unrealized potential stability and security in international affairs is
difficult to quantify, explaining why states don’t recognize the significance of this threat.
Recent history has included a set of states that have experienced the dynamics of alienation
at varying levels. Examples include Cuba, South Africa, North Korea, Burma, and Iran. Some of

7

these have isolated themselves as a consequence of domestic politics, such as Burma, while others
have become isolated as a result of larger-scale dynamics, such as Cuba in the Cold War context. In
the cases where the international community has started the alienation, there have been legitimate
reasons to believe that the states’ motivations are incompatible with the status of the international
system. This is the case for North Korea, based on its authoritarian regime and deeply militaryoriented foreign policy, and South Africa during the apartheid era.
Iran is a clear example of country that has experienced the repetitive patterns of alienation
and has responded with a confrontational foreign policy strategy after the country went through an
Islamic revolution in 1979.14 Many countries perceive Iran as a radical revisionist state that doesn’t
follow the norms of behavior in the international community, which has given them a reason to
isolate the country. The United States has described its approach as a “general containment policy
toward political and economic isolation.”15 It sees Iran as a rogue state with aims to establish itself as
a regional hegemon, which would interfere with U.S. interests: “Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology,
its obstruction of the Middle East peace process, its involvement in the Beirut attacks of the 1980s
and the 1996 Khobar Towers (Saudi Arabia) bombing of an American troop residence, and
providing lethal aid to violent non-state actors in Lebanon, Iraq, the Palestinian territories and
Afghanistan are viewed by the United States as obstacles to rapprochement.”16
Iran has responded to this approach as the feedback loop assumes, with a confrontational
foreign policy that based on its notion that the United States is overreaching its influence in the
region: “The United States is viewed by the Iranian government as a hostile, interventionist state
attempting to topple the Iranian republic, indicated by the U.S. role in the 1953 coup d’état of the
Edmund Herzig, “Regionalism, Iran and Central Asia,” International Affairs 80, No. 3 (2004): 503-517.
Akan Malici and Allison Buckner, “Empathizing with Rogue Leaders: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Bashar al-Asad,”
Journal of Peace Research 45, No. 6 (2008): 783-800.
16 Mir Sadat and James Hughes, “U.S.-Iran Engagement Through Afghanistan,” Middle East Policy Council XVII, No. 1
(Spring 2010).
14
15
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legal Iranian government, vehement rejection of the Islamic Revolution, disregard for Saddam
Hussein’s use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, the shooting down of an Iranian
passenger plane, imposing economic sanctions, freezing of Iranian financial assets, resistance to
Iranian nuclear progress for clean energy, and threats to invade or attack Iran.”17 This shows the
mutual perceptions that Iran and the United States have of each other as greedy, which has led to
the creation of a security dilemma that rationalizes confrontational foreign policies and makes the
mutual perceptions to become self-fulfilled.

Consequences of Alienation
As outcasts, alienated countries lack the incentive to maintain a positive and cooperative
reputation in the international community, as they will be considered revisionist in any case. The
strategies adopted as a consequence of disenfranchisement can all be interpreted as offensive
methods of projecting power and considered illegitimate in the current international system. The
international community’s destabilizing confrontational responses lead to reinforced mutual
misperceptions, which reflects how the dynamics of alienation lead to the self-fulfilling conditions.
One way for alienated states to project power is to sponsor terrorist groups. The strategy
contains the important aspect of force multiplication, which becomes increasingly important for
states as their foreign policy options become more limited.18 Iran has used a variety of terrorist
groups to project its power regionally and globally. It has been considered the most active state
sponsor of terrorism during the past decades, with activity in providing arms, training, financing,
planning and other assistance to Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), as well as other

Sadat and Hughes, “U.S.-Iran Engagement Through Afghanistan.”
Stephen Collins, “State-Sponsored Terrorism: In Decline, Yet Still a Potent Threat,” Politics & Policy 42, No. 1 (2014):
131-159.
17
18
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antigovernment militants.19 While the total Iranian support to many of these groups declined after
the 9/11 attacks, in line with a global restraint in state sponsorship of terrorism that the events
precipitated. After 2010, Iran has resumed a more active position in assisting terrorist groups,
presumably as a reaction to assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, heightened threat of a
military attack from Israel and the United States, and increased economic sanctions.20 The Quds
Force, the Iranian military’s special operations division, has an essential role in using the terrorist
sponsorship activities to achieve Iran’s strategic objectives.21
Iran’s nuclear program is another example of its confrontational foreign policy. Iran is a
party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has agreed to IAEA safeguards and surveillance since
1974.22 It has developed civilian nuclear capabilities since the early 1970s through the Atoms for
Peace program, but all outside help ended following the revolution in 1979.23 The events caused the
country’s nuclear aspirations to halt before a revival in late 1980s as a consequence of the Iran-Iraq
war.24 The country started further increasing its efforts to achieve nuclear capabilities in the 1990s,
after which the initial accusations of weapons development emerged.25 In 2002, “IAEA has
identified nuclear sites, equipment, and activities that, contrary to its obligations, Iran failed to report
to the IAEA.”26 In 2007, intelligence from the United States assessed that the nuclear weapons
development efforts had been discontinued, but new evidence in 2009 revealed that a second

Ibid.
Ibid.
21 Anthony Cordesman, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other Intelligence and Paramilitary
Forces,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 15, 2007.
Collins, “State-Sponsored Terrorism: In Decline, Yet Still a Potent Threat,” 131-159.
22
Greg Bruno, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Council for Foreign Relations, March 10, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/iran/iransnuclear-program/p16811.
23 Ibid.
24 Shahram Chubin, “The Politics of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” United States Institute of Peace, 2010, last updated August
2015, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/politics-irans-nuclear-program.
25 Bruno, “Iran’s Nuclear Program.”
26 “Contemporary Practice of the U.S. Relating to International Law,” American Journal of International Law 99, pp. 253.
19
20
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uranium enrichment facility had been built in Qom.27 The following year, an IAEA report further
emphasized the suspicions of continued Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons.28
The development of nuclear arms by Iran is motivated by its aim to create deterrent hedge
against foreign attack and the nuclear capabilities that Israel possesses, which can both be seen as
rational calculations. However, its drive towards achieving these capabilities is furthered by a sense
that the international community aims to restrict its rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
suppress the country’s technological development, and alienate the country from the international
community.29 This has provoked the country to feel a lack of legitimacy, respect, and dignity as a
power player in the international community, and led the country to see the nuclear program as a
strategic option for guaranteeing its security.30 The country’s nuclear program poses a severe
international security threat also due to its potential to precipitate a regional nuclear arms race, as it
makes the countries in the Middle East feel insecure and rationalize their need for creating matching
programs.31
Additionally, Iran has sophisticated capabilities in missile technology, developed in the
aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war.32 Iran purchased the initial capabilities and production lines for
ballistic missiles from North Korea, and has subsequently developed an indigenous missile
program.33 In addition, it has started developing unmanned aerial vehicles modeled after Western
designs, as well as space launch capabilities.34 Iran has also focused on gaining extensive capabilities

Bruno, “Iran’s Nuclear Program.”
Ibid.
29 Chubin, “The Politics of Iran’s Nuclear Program.”
30 Clifford Kupchan, “Iranian Beliefs and Realities,” The National Interest 81 (Fall 2005): 106.
31 Nodir Ataev, “Economic Sanctions and Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of Iran,” Central European University,
Department of Economics.
32 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Country Profile: Iran,” last modified October, 2015, http://www.nti.org/countryprofiles/iran/.
33 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Country Profile: Iran.”
34 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Country Profile: Iran.”
27
28

11

in the cyber domain, which as an asymmetric field provides potential for strategic advantages.35 All
of these sophisticated technologies indicate a continuing effort in Iran to enhance their offensive
capabilities to attain security and ability to protect territorial sovereignty. Due to isolation, the state
has been forced to adopt these radical approaches to pursue its security-seeking goals.
As a response to Iran’s radical foreign policy strategies, particularly its nuclear and missile
programs, the international community has established a sanctions regime against the country
through the United Nations Security Council.36 Individual countries and regions have also
established separate sanctions programs as a response to the proliferation threat, including the
United States through additional unilateral sanctions. Iran has also become isolated from the
international banking system, as banks are discouraged from “providing loans, export credits, and
other financial services to Iran.”37 The Iranian sponsorship of terrorism has also induced other
responses that limit the country’s participation in the global economy. The country has been
designated by the U.S. State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism, leading to the imposition of
additional sanctions that include a ban on arms-related exports and sales, dual-use items, and a
prohibition of receiving economic assistance.38
The sanction regime and other isolating economic policies have led to destabilizing effects to
the global economy and overall international security. Iran is a major oil producer internationally,
and is located along the Strait of Hormuz, which is critical in the supply chain of oil from the
Persian Gulf to the global oil market.39 Iran has threatened to seal off the strait from international

Atlantic Council, “Iran’s Growing Cyber Capabilities in a Post-Stuxnet Era,” April 10, 2015,
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/iran-s-growing-cyber-capabilities-in-a-post-stuxnet-era.
36 Ataev, “Economic Sanctions and Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of Iran.”
37 “Continuing U.S. Efforts to Discourage Iran's Nuclear Program,” The American Journal of International Law 101, No. 3
(July 2007): 666-668.
38 United States Department of State, “Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview,” Bureau of Counterterrorism,
Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239410.htm.
39 Peter Pham, “Iran's Threat to the Strait of Hormuz: A Realist Assessment,” American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal
of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy 32, Issue 2 (2010): 64-74.
35

12

use as a response to military actions from the United States or Israel, which would disable the
shipments of one-fifth of the world’s daily use of oil.40 This possibility creates a significant threat to
international security, both in economic terms and through creating the possibility of escalating a
preventive war.
As a side effect of the international sanctions and other alienating efforts, Iran has also
sustained severe human security implications in its domestic environment. The economic
consequences of sanctions have worsened the state of the already weak economy and hurt the
general population, whereas the elites have found tools to circumvent the negative implications and
costs.41 In addition to economic suffering, the population has also experienced the effects of
alienation from the international community. The freedom to travel internationally, study abroad,
engage in international trade, and many other activities are more challenging for Iranian citizens.42
The human rights record of the government also reflects the negative effects of alienation to the
general population. Iran has been criticized for limiting the freedom of speech, disregarding fair
trials and the rule of law, and overall repressing its population in a variety of areas. All of these
effects have been intensified as a result of alienation, as the government has found further ground
for radical approaches to maintain stability.
All of these consequences are a reflection of the security dilemma that has emerged as a
result of Iran’s outcast position in the international community. These strategies and
counterstrategies have severe destabilizing effects on the international community and pose a threat
to international security. However, a more significant reason why these dynamics are so threatening
to global stability stems from the potential risks that the international community has fortunately
avoided so far, including nuclear war. At times, Israel and the United States were on the cusp of
Ibid.
Ataev, “Economic Sanctions and Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of Iran.”
42 Ibid.
40
41
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attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities, but fortunately the conditions never escalated to kinetic war. The
Stuxnet cyberattack, however, demonstrates that the Israel-U.S. side had willingness to confront Iran
and possibly take their offensive further. The end result could have been very different, if the
conditions and internal deliberations in the countries had been slightly more aggressive.
Furthermore, the situation is a threat to the international security due to the intangible costs
related to the missed potential of stability and security to the global community. Iran has a
significant stake in some of the most pressing international security challenges based on its
geographical position and regional relations, including the Sunni-Shi’ia sectarian tensions, the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Israel-Palestine conflict. Due to its alienated position, Iran has usually
not been included as a legitimate party in the negotiations, which has disabled the utilization of the
country’s political resources and interests as a leverage to solve the conflicts. With regard to the
conflict in Syria, for example, the country was first invited by the United Nations to participate in
the Geneva-II peace talks in 2014. Pressure from the United States, however, led to the withdrawal
of the invitation.43 Iran has continued its participation in the conflict through arming Shi’ite militias
and collaborating with Russia, which further exemplifies how the country is forced to project its
power through radical strategies. In addition, there are opportunity costs related to the defensive and
offensive capabilities that countries have deployed as a result of the heightened threat they
experience from Iran. If the countries adapted their perceptions of each other and developed more
cordial relations, based on accurate threat considerations, these resources could be used more
effectively to attain security.

Solution
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The international community’s ability to end the diplomacy of alienation depends, first and
foremost, whether or not the targeted state is revisionist or only misperceived as one. The feedback
loop functions the same way in both situations, so a key first step is determining what the specific
circumstances are with the state in questions. In essence, this means that the strategies towards
reintegrating alienated states must be highly individualized and tailored to fit the specific conditions.
Overall, if the state in question is truly power-seeking and revisionist, then the international
community can only incentivize it to end its radical foreign policy approaches if the state is given
means to gain a more powerful position and reach its objectives through more legitimate strategies.
But given the role that the diplomacy of alienation has in great power competition, this would be
seen as giving in to the opposing side and allowing it to gain power through its proxy state. Thus,
the solution to ending the diplomacy of alienation in these conditions requires a shift in the
relationship between great powers. This is a function of complex dynamics between the states,
however, and the mechanisms that could be used to precipitate this change are very limited. Thus,
the solution should be focused on circumstances where there is potential for an interruption in the
feedback loop that could lead to the reintegration of the alienated state.
A promising opening for shifting away from alienating diplomacy, however, can emerge
when there is a disruption in the dynamics of the self-fulfilling feedback loop. First, this can be the
result of the isolated state escalating its radical approaches, which can lead to a change in the
relations between the great powers. The escalation of radical strategies can turn the supporter state
against its proxy and incentivize it to cooperate with the opposing side to restrain the radical state.
In these conditions, the feedback loop has accelerated to a breaking point, where the destabilizing
foreign policy strategies of the revisionist small power are also becoming a security threat to the
supporter state. Now, a consensus can be reached within the international community to take a
more forceful approach against the revisionist state, leading to measures that can end the
15

destabilizing effects that threaten the collective security of the global community. This scenario
would seem relatively rare, however, as the smaller revisionist states have learned to strike an
equilibrium where they can use the great power competition in their benefit and continue using their
radical approaches as a means of projecting power in the international community.
Secondly, the disruption in the dynamics of the feedback loop can emerge in the form of a
changed status of the revisionist state and its motivations. If the state starts to reconsider the
benefits of pursuing power unilaterally as an alienated state, as opposed to according to international
norms of behavior, it may conclude that the latter option is preferable in the current conditions of
the world. Especially as the international community as a whole is becoming more interconnected,
the benefits of cooperation are increasing and the opportunity costs of being outside the system are
becoming more burdening. The challenge is, however, that the iterations of the feedback loop
reinforce the current perceptions that states have of each other. Alienating diplomacy ensures that
states continue to see each other as opponents and consider the other side as revisionist, even if
there are reasons to change notions about the states’ motivations and their behavioral compatibility
with international norms.
The solution to a scenario where the revisionist state has fundamentally changed its priorities
must address the different dimensions of the feedback loop. States need to critically consider their
assumptions about other states’ driving motivations and be receptive to changing their notions, if
there is a reason to do so. This new approachability will also incentivize the alienated states to start
respecting international norms and act collaboratively. This will also provide a basis for addressing
the second challenge, as the changed perceptions will eventually enable the reintegration of the
alienated states to the international community and grant them access to the full spectrum of foreign
policy choices that are in accordance with the current international order. As this happens, the
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countries also gain ability to use their diplomatic resources and interests as a means to deescalate
some of the most pressing conflicts that threaten international security and stability.
These aims can be achieved through embarking on an interactive dialogue that enables both
sides to increase their knowledge of the other side’s intentions and motivations, as well as create
clarity about the expected responses the counterpart will take. Changing states’ false perceptions
about each other’s driving motivations requires the feedback loop to decelerate, in order for new
informational variables to be taken into account. The focus needs to be on the factors that enable
states to cooperate in the first place – creating iterated interactions, ensuring mutual gains from
cooperation, emphasizing the opportunity cost of noncooperation, and decreasing the risk of
deflection.
Given the multiple sources that feed the security dilemma that results from alienating
diplomacy, and especially the linkage to great power competition, this requires one of the states to
take a risk and start convincing the other state of its true intentions. One means of doing this is
costly signaling, which essentially constitutes a leap of faith from a state to increase its adversary’s
security and aims to demonstrate the state’s status as a security seeker: “An effective costly signal
convinces the adversary to revise its information about the state, reducing its estimate that the state
is greedy, thereby increasing the willingness of an opposing security seeker to cooperate.”44
International institutions are in an important role in enabling states to take this risk, as they
can act as a legitimate forum for interaction and provide a mechanism for states to send transparent
signals about their intentions and motivations. When costly signaling is done through international
institutions, the associated risks are also lessened. The feedback loop can eventually be halted,
leading to circumstances where “the security dilemma is eliminated and neither state has incentives
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to compete, even if material conditions would otherwise fuel insecurity and competition.”45 Thus,
this very realist problem can be approached through a liberal solution that bases its legitimacy on
international institutions and cooperation.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was signed in July 2015 between Iran, the
five UNSC permanent members, and Germany, is an example of costly signal that can act as a
precipitating factor for the shift in mutual perceptions.46 The agreement details the steps that the
country will take to terminate its nuclear proliferation efforts in exchange for the lifting of
international sanctions. The agreement is built on security concerns and aims to disarm Iran of the
capability of developing nuclear arms, but it also lessens the risk of a foreign attack in Iran and acts
as an initial confidence-building measure between the country and the West. The agreement poses
risks for both sides, however, as Iran is willingly disarming its nuclear weapons capabilities, and the
West is allowing Iran to access financial resources that could be used to build offenses in the future.
The nuclear agreement can be employed as an initial platform for ending the confrontational
consequences of the feedback loop of alienation and finding new areas for cooperation between Iran
and the West. The JCPA connects the issue of nonproliferation to economic benefits; a similar
linkage framework could be used next to address other problematic issue areas in Iran’s foreign and
domestic policies. Promoting human rights, strengthening civil society, and legitimizing the rule of
law are examples of challenges that Iran could be encouraged to improve on, if these issues were
linked to incentives such as additional financial benefits or diplomatic recognition. These actions
would start to change the mutual perceptions that the two sides have of each other, and start
granting Iran legitimate foreign policy tools that it currently doesn’t have access to due to its
economic and political isolation.
45
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Obstacles to Solutions
When the diplomacy of alienation is mainly driven by great power competition and concrete
reasons to believe that the revisionist power is using its radical approaches to project its power, the
key obstacle is at the core of these dynamics. As stated, these conditions will only shift when there
are incentives for the other side of the great power equation to change its stance, which requires a
change in the relationship between the great powers. If, on the other hand, the diplomacy of
alienation is maintained through mutual misperceptions, the key obstacles to ending isolation relate
to factors in domestic politics and individual state leadership of the involved countries. If the
domestic-level general population, elites, and individual leaders continue perceiving a high threat
level from the opposing side, they are not open to taking in new informational variables that could
result in adapted perceptions and shifting foreign policy approaches.
In the classical realist paradigm, states are seen as unitary actors and essentially as ‘black
boxes’ that only respond to systemic-level variables. Relaxing this assumption to include factors at
the domestic and individual levels, however, is necessary for developing a more comprehensive
understanding of how the obstructive dynamics related to alienation arise in the real world. The
divergent and conflicting threat perceptions of different constituencies within nations create friction
that will have an impact on the state’s multinational interactions with other countries. Even if
systemic level considerations included perfect conditions for states to interact, cooperate, and
change their misperceptions, the challenges arising from the domestic and individual levels can
prevent any changes from happening.
The factors influencing the internal threat perceptions within states include the issue’s
strategic or emotional priority; the interpretation of the atmosphere of tension and mistrust in the
state’s relations with other actors; and the observer state’s perception of its vulnerability in the
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situation.47 Additionally, threatening cues often involve actions or events that “imply the betrayal of
a trust or the performance of an illegitimate action – the infringement, in some sense, of rules of the
game governing relations between the actors involved.”48 All of these factors relate to the threat of
deception and the danger that states don’t behave according to the expected and accepted norms.
This possibility is a strong disincentive for leaders to take any steps towards enhanced interaction
and integration, which will consequently prevent changes in their perception of the other state’s
motivations.
The dynamics that took place after the collapse of the Soviet Union provide an important
case study of the successes and failures of engagement and integration policies towards states that
were previously perceived as opponents. In this context, the NATO integration process can be seen
as a form of costly signaling. The military alliance took a strong approach towards interacting with
former Warsaw Pact members in the Eastern block of Europe, which in many cases resulted in their
full integration both economically and in security terms as NATO members.49 Poland provides one
example of a former Warsaw Pact member that has successfully become a full member of the
European community, as it is one of the fastest growing economies in Europe and a strong
contributor to the NATO alliance. The key for successfully changing mutual perceptions and initiate
the integration process relates to the historic experiences and internal drive to integrate within the
target countries: “Attracted by both the prosperity that the European Union promised and the
security that NATO’s Article 5 common defense commitment delivered, Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary, the first three new entrants, were keen to anchor themselves in the west.
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Notably, each of these countries had had a searing experience under Russian domination, creating a
natural impulse to escape the shadow of their larger, eastern neighbor.”50
However, the NATO integration efforts have not automatically resulted in mended relations
and successful integration. The idea of Russia becoming a NATO member floated around in early
2000’s, with a genuine aim of integrating the country in the security alliance. In the following years,
however, the relations went to the opposite direction. As a result of Russia’s annexation of Crimea,
many states again perceive the country as revisionist and radical. This shows how difficult it is to
assess state intentions and create expectations about their behavior, and what the risks of a failed
costly signaling can be. Studying empirical examples of states with diverse historical experiences and
domestic circumstances is crucial in understanding the role of domestic politics and individual
leadership in creating effective engagement policies and avoiding miscalculations.
The obstacles that can prevent Iran from becoming accepted as a full member of the
international community are also a function of internal politics and individual leaders. The domestic
political sphere of Iran is divided and turbulent, with internal power struggles and conflicting views
about the intentions of other countries. There is also severe disagreement in the international
community, and within individual states, about the logic of approaching Iran as a negotiation partner
and granting it legitimacy. This was demonstrates in the debate within the United States government,
where certain politicians took it as their objective to “keep U.S.-Iranian relations trapped in a spiral
of suspicion, demonization, and counterproductive rivalry.”51 These dynamics create a reinforcing
effect in the feedback loop and enable continued antagonistic perceptions: “Won’t continuing to
treat Iran as a pariah reinforce its own hard-liners’ claims that the “Great Satan” is irrevocably
hostile, and give them every reason to continue the activities that still concern us? At the very least,
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isn’t assuming the worst about Iran – something the United States has done for decades – just a selffulfilling prophecy?”52
This does not need to be Iran’s position in the world, however. 53 The country’s leadership is
assessed as rational and security-oriented, as opposed to inherently radical and expansionist:
“Overall, Iran’s motivations for backing radicals are primarily strategic, though ideology does play a
role. Unlike Pakistan, domestic politics is not an important driver of Iran’s support for terrorism.
Ties to terrorists and to militant substate groups in general give Iran several strategic advantages.”54
If the international community is able to engage with the country in a way that outweighs the
security advantages that the current foreign policy strategies have, there is tremendous potential for
cooperation. The challenge will be on deciding how to approach the ideological conflict within the
country – whether to engage with these components, or prevent them from interfering with the
rational aspects of the country’s policymaking community.
There are several hopeful signs that this process is possible to initiate and implement. Even
though there were clear reasons for the international community to perceive Iran as revisionist at the
time of the revolution, and following the country’s radical foreign policy approaches, there are now
several signals that indicate a reason to change these assumptions. First, the fact that several
countries, including Russia and China, have continuously perceived Iran as a rational state and
developed important security and economic alliances with it, which demonstrates that Iran is indeed
motivated by security priorities. Second, the recent success of the nuclear agreement shows Iran’s
willingness to reengage with the West and accept the norms of the current international order, which
also creates a rationale for states to diminish their threat perceptions of the country. Several states,
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including many in Europe, have already started to shift their assessment of Iran’s motivations and
engage with the country economically and diplomatically. In the months following the JCPA, Iran
has already welcomed trade delegations from France, the United Kingdom, Italy, India, and multiple
other states.55 The country was also granted a legitimate role in the relaunched Syrian peace
negotiations, which is a sign that the United States and Saudi Arabia might also be changing their
views about the strategic implications of engaging with Iran.56
In addition to these current signs of the shifting mutual perceptions, the past also provides a
powerful indication that Iran is capable of extensive collaboration with the international community,
including the Unites States. During the Cold War and prior to the Islamic revolution, the United
States maintained very cordial relations with the Shah-ruled Iran.57 This is a strong indication that
there are no systemic-level reasons that would make the states incompatible for collaboration. If
both sides see enough utility for the partnership and consider their interests to be aligned,
cooperation can be established and both sides can be experience a threat of deflection that is
sufficiently low.
Iran’s inclusion as a full member of the international community creates considerable
potential for enhanced international security conditions and increased stability particularly in South
Asia and the greater Middle East. One of the issue areas where Iran’s inclusion could make
significant contributions towards improved international security is the situation in Afghanistan,
where there all regional players have critical convergent interests in countering drug trafficking,
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developing infrastructure, and managing water issues.58 Iran has already played an important role in
the country, as it was a key contributor in the process that led to the establishment of the new
Afghan government after the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, before U.S.-Iran relations
froze as a result of President Bush associated the country as a part of ‘the axis of evil’.59 During this
period, Iran used its influence on the behalf of the United States in its relations with the Northern
Alliance and other parts of the Afghan opposition.60 Iran has a legitimate interest reestablishing its
role in this issue area and improving the condition of the fragile country. Solving the situation in
Afghanistan has been an enormous challenge to the international community and resulted in
continued regional instability, and bringing Iran and its resources back into the equation could result
in greatly improved security and stability in in South Asia.
The conflict in Syria is another area where the changed perceptions of Iran could lead to
significant implications to international security and stability. In its current position, Iran projects its
power through funding Shi’ite militias and supporting the Assad government with Russia. Western
and Iranian interests in the conflict are strongly aligned in many ways, however, and enhanced
relations could enable genuine military and diplomatic cooperation in these areas.61 This could
increase the possibility of a sustainable solution to the conflict that has already killed over 250,000
Syrians, and greatly improve the stability of the greater Middle East. Solving the Syrian conflict
through Iranian help could also create synergies in other unstable hostilities in the region, including
Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the latter, Iran and Syria have been key countries
obstructing the peace between Arabs and Israelis, as the states see it to be incompatible with their
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own regional and strategic interests.62 Changed Iranian relations with the West would change the
state’s cost-benefit analysis, however, and incentivize it to shift its views of the best solution to the
conflict.
The international community’s next steps need to focus on capitalizing the value that the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action brings as a form of costly signaling, and turning the agreement
from a security guarantee into a vehicle of interaction and integration. Enhanced trade relations and
the inclusion of Iran in diplomatic negotiations can be used as further confidence-building measures
to enable shifts in the perceptions of the states’ domestic constituencies and leadership. The
challenge is that the improving relations may first create an intensification in hostile perceptions and
actions in certain factions within the countries, if the changing status quo results in lost financial or
political benefits. Following the JCPA, there have been accelerating Iranian cyberattack activity
against the United States, and increasingly hostile political rhetoric within certain American interest
groups.63 The best option for all sides is to patiently restrain from overreactions and escalation, and
wait for the domestic politics within states to regain balance and reach a new stable state that accepts
the changed relations.

Conclusion
Diplomacy of alienation is a threat to the security and stability of the international
community, but it is also a policy that is difficult to reverse. At its core, it is driven by systemic-level
great power competition, but it can also be maintained as a residual of these dynamics in the form of
misperceptions that states have of each other’s motivations. Both of these scenarios lead to a
condition that constitutes a self-feeding security dilemma, creating layers of antagonistic history and
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hostile relations, which will always stay at the back of the minds of domestic constituencies and
national leaders. As the case of Iran demonstrates, however, the international community can engage
with the alienated countries incrementally and start building confidence through measures such as
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. A tremendous amount of analysis, understanding, and
strategic thinking is required for states to reestablish confidence and start changing their perceptions
of other states’ motivations. As a statement from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei demonstrates, however,
these efforts will not be futile and will be reciprocated in the correct conditions: “Show us if really
anything other than your language has changed. -- Should you change, our behavior will change too.
-- My expectation is, in the coming months, we will be looking for openings that can be created
where we can start sitting across the table, face to face, diplomatic overtures that will allow us to
move our policy in a new direction.”64 This prospect should reenergize the international community
to pursue rapprochement and mend relations with states that are lost in the confinement of
alienating diplomacy that are based on misperceptions.
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